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University of Michigan 
of Self-Representation 
The seven papers included in this volume converge in many o f  their assump- 
tions about the representation o f  the self, yet a number o f  issues remain un- 
resolved. These issues, including the structure and functioning o f  self-repre- 
sentations, and the role o f  negativity, affect, and the "other" in the self-system, 
are discussed here. 
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UNRESOLV ED  ISSUES OF SELF-REPRESENTATION 
This is a fascinating collection of papers. Each piece is noteworthy in at least 
one respect and together they comprise an unusually useful, important 
volume. Harter's paper is an insightful integration of the literature on self- 
representation in children, as well as a cogent appeal for attending to de- 
velopmental differences in the nature and functioning of self-representations. 
Segal and Vella's replicates and extends their work on cognitive organiza- 
tion in depression, and raises the thorny question of the presence of negativ- 
ity in all self-systems-viable and nonviable alike. The work of Hope, Rapee, 
Heimberg, and Dombeck is an intriguing exploration of the self-schemas of 
social phobics. Bemis and Hollon contribute a thoughtful, engaging piece 
on assessing the operation of self-schemas in eating disorders, and provide 
a suggestion about the cognitive essence of these schemata. The Hammen 
and Goodman-Brown paper, in an important extension of earlier work, ex- 
amines the potential role of self-schemas in the onset of depression in chil- 
dren. Finally, Safran, Segal, Hill, and Whiffen discuss a number of 
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methodological issues pertinent to the assessment of self-schemas, and then 
pose the highly significant and consequential question of the role of the 
"other" in the formation and functioning of self-schemas. 
As a group these papers draw attention to a number of important con- 
ceptual and methodological issues in research on the representation of the 
self. I will focus here on the conceptual issues because many of the methodo- 
logical concerns have been thoroughly discussed in a recent paper by Segal 
(1988) on the self-schema construct in depression. Overall, these papers re- 
veal an impressive number of shared assumptions about representations of 
the self, a diversity of unresolved issues, and some areas of potential con- 
troversy. 
The Self as a Collection of  Self-Schemas 
The authors of these papers hold fairly similar views of the nature and 
functioning of the self-system. All of the theorists included here are true to 
a general cognitive model of the self that has its roots in the early work of 
Rogers (1951), Kelly (1955), Combs and Snygg (1959), Bruner (1957), and 
Allport (1955). The self envisioned here is a dynamic one; it is not a static 
entity that simply reflects past experience. It is active, forceful, and capable 
of change (see Markus & Wurf, 1987). Further, the self is a multidimension- 
al, multifaceted set of structures that plays a critical role in organizing all 
aspects of behavior. These structures, called self-schemas in most of the 
papers in this volume, provide the categories by which to render experience 
meaningful. As Kegan (1982) says, "human being is the composing of mean- 
ing" (p. 11), and it is the consensus of these contributors that structures of 
the self are front and center in the meaning-making process. Happily, in this 
volume, concerns over whether the self-structure is a "unique" structure, or 
whether the available data on self-structure pass the gold standard test for 
what is a "real" cognitive structure (see, e.g., Higgins & Bargh, 1987) have 
been put aside in favor of a variety of other questions. 
In this emerging view of the self, each person is hypothesized to hold 
a diverse array of representations about the se l f - the  good me, the bad me, 
the not me, the actual me, the ideal me, the ought me, the possible me, the 
undesired me, the hoped-for me, the expected me, the feared me, and the 
shared me (i.e., me-in-relation-to-my mother; me-in-relation-to my spouse, 
etc.). Of this universe of self-representations, only some will become focal 
for the individual and receive a high degree of cognitive, affective, or so- 
matic elaboration. Those representations that, for whatever reason, become 
the target of such intensive elaboration are the self-schemas. And it is the 
self-schemas that will dominate consciousness, and perhaps unconsciousness, 
and that can be considered the "core" self. 
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Although individuals of a given age or a given linguistic or cultural group 
are likely to share some self-representations, the view here is that individu- 
als differ importantly in the nature, and perhaps in the number of domains 
in which they define themselves. People with a self-schema in a particular 
domain or for a specific issue-whether it is for their roles as parent, spouse, 
or friend~ for their expertise about sports, food, or the stock market, for 
their attributes of creativity or independence, or for their fears of being fat 
or anxious in large gatherings-consider these domains and issues to be of 
critical personal importance. As such, they will maintain an enduring invest- 
ment and commitment to these self-defining domains. 
Individuals are assumed to construct self-representations from the in- 
formation contained in their unfolding life experiences. As they do so, they 
gain an impressive knowledge base, perhaps even a genuine expertise, about 
their abilities, their preferences, their hopes and fears. Such self-construction 
does not avail itself of information indiscriminately, rather it is selective and 
creative. And once established the influence of these self-schemas is perva- 
sive. They determine what to pay attention to in one's self and others, what 
to think about, what to remember, as well as the nature of many of one's 
judgments, inferences, and decisions. For example, as the studies by Hope 
et al. and Segal and Vella (this volume) indicate, subjects take longer to name 
the color of the ink that a word is written in if the word is self-relevant than 
they do if it is irrelevant. Self-relevant stimuli demand and divert attention; 
they cannot be ignored. 
The Structure and Functioning of  Self-Representations 
Although it is not addressed explicitly, one has the impression from 
most of these papers that the self-schemas associated with emotional disor- 
ders will be essentially like more viable self-schemas. What distinguishes the 
schemas of emotional disorder is only the content of the self-schema. Thus 
depressives will have self-schemas relevant to depression, social phobics will 
have self-schemas relevant to their fear of social situations, and those with 
eating disorders will have schemas relevant to their eating disorders. This 
is a very reasonable initial assumption. And indeed, many of the achieve- 
ments of cognitive therapy are an outgrowth of the assumption that some 
important aspects of emotional disorders derive from domain-specific self- 
schemas that are structuring experience in just the ways hypothesized by sche- 
ma theory. 
The critical issue raised by these papers, however, is whether it is con- 
tent alone that distinguishes a maladaptive self-schema. What is the differ- 
ence between Joan who weights 110 pounds, is 5'4", and lives a life centered 
almost entirely on a fear of someday weighing 120 pounds, and Jane who 
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is of identical height and weight but who doesn't know her precise weight 
and has never dieted a day in the life? Is the difference only a matter of the 
content of their self-defining schemas? With the exception of the Bemis and 
Hollon piece, no more than passing attention is given to possible differences 
in the functioning of self-representations of those with emotional disorders. 
Yet if one makes the plausible assumption that what one thinks about in- 
fluences how one thinks, it is likely that the self-schemas of the depressive 
or the social phobic will function differently from self-schemas organized 
around other content domains. Consistent with this notion, Bemis and Hol- 
Ion suggest that because of the needs being served by body weight schemas, 
weight may be a unusually powerful dimension in the perceptual tool-kit of 
anorexics. As a consequence, their schema-relevant judgments may be even 
more extreme and engender even more confidence than is typical of schema- 
relevant judgments. Bemis and Hollon also suggest that schemas accompany- 
ing eating disorders may be particularly resistant to counter-schematic feed- 
back, perhaps more so than schemas in other domains. Such extreme 
resistance, they argue, derives not only from the desire to be thin or not to 
be fat, but from an attempt to simplify and gain control over events by reduc- 
ing the number of their important life tasks (see Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987). 
Indications that the self-schemas of those with emotional disturbances 
produce different, stronger, or more powerful effects on processing than other 
types of self-schemas lead to the suggestion that the former self-schemas 
(e.g., the weight-related self-schemas of eating-disordered subjects) may be 
especially well-elaborated and likely to assume centrality in the self-systems 
of these individuals. To this point, however, very little attention has been 
given to analyzing the structure of either a single self-schema or the overall 
self-system. Self-schemas are hypothesized to be complex, highly integrated 
structures. Presumably, they consist of information about the self that is 
organized into a unified structure such that if one part of the structure is 
activated, the entire structure is activated. Yet because the field currently 
lacks an obvious methodology for evaluating the degree or extent of cogni- 
tive structure, there have been few direct tests of these assertion. 
Stein (1989) in a recently completed study, suggests that some of the 
methodologies previously used in the study of cognitive style and cognitive 
structure might be profitably applied to the study of the structure of self- 
representations. Using a revision of Zajonc's (1960) approach to the assess- 
ment of cognitive structure, she carried out a study that required subjects 
to freely generate as many characteristics as they felt described them in par- 
ticular domains (e.g., as a student or as a son), and then to determine whether 
those descriptors fell into some natural groupings and subgroupings. Fur- 
ther, she asked subjects to determine for each of the self-generated charac- 
teristics listed which of the other characteristics would also change if this 
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characteristic were to change. This later measure allowed a determination 
of how much the schema was organized around any single element. For each 
subject Stein was then able to determine the mean complexity of  a given sche- 
ma (i.e., the extent to which the self-conceptions were organized in a hier- 
archical structure) and the mean organization (i.e., the extent to which the 
schema was organized around a single self-conception). 
Following a procedure in which these students were told they had done 
poorly on a newly developed test of intelligence, Stein found that subjects 
with high integration of  the student schema (i.e., where the descriptors are 
organized into hierarchical structure and where the descriptors are organ- 
ized around a single core element) appeared to take account of  the feedback 
in subsequent self-evaluations. In contrast, subjects with low integration of 
the student schema denied the feedback and simply reasserted relevant posi- 
tive aspects of the self. 
A procedure like that of  Stein's might allow investigators to determine 
whether the schemas associated with particular emotional disorders have a 
distinctive structure. Emotional disorders may be associated with low integra- 
tion of  self-schemas in positive domains and high integration of self-schemas 
in negative domains. Techniques developed to explore variation in the struc- 
ture in self-representation would also allow a close-up look at the contents 
of the relevant self-schemas, and perhaps some determination of the nature 
of their core or unifying elements. For example, two pieces in this volume 
(Bemis & Hollon; and Hope et al.) suggest that the self-representations of 
disturbed individuals may not be in the declarative form (e.g., I am fat, I 
am weak) often assumed to characterize self-schemas. Rather, Bemis and 
Hollon find that eating-disordered individuals often make conditional state- 
ments like, "If I am fat, I cannot ..." and Hope et al. report that social phobics 
report that i f  they blush or shake too much "she will think I am a wimp." 
Conditional statements like this may be at the heart of all self-schemas. To 
investigate such questions will require techniques that allow a detailed ex- 
amination of  the content of specific schemas. 
Beyond efforts to measure the structure of  the organization of  a single 
schema, it could also be useful to assess the structure of the entire self-system. 
Linville (1982, 1987) has been concerned with just this problem and uses a 
task in which subjects are required to sort trait descriptors into meaningful 
groups. She finds that individuals with many overlapping or redundant 
categories of self-description experience a greater decrease in their self- 
evaluation after a threat or a challenge than those with many, nonoverlap- 
ping categorizations. With further work on the structure of  the self-system, 
one could examine, for example, whether individuals with a hierarchically 
organized self-system that has "self as good" or "worthy" or loved" as a su- 
per dinate category are less at risk for emotional disorder. 
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A critical feature in understanding why some individuals with a partic- 
ular self-schema show emotional disturbances while others do not, or in de- 
termining why some individuals construct particular self-representations in 
the first place, may well depend on some understanding of what other self- 
schemas are included an individual's repertoire. In other words, what does 
the embedding context for a particular self-schema look like? Once a sche- 
ma gains hold and becomes dominant in regulating behavior, what other sche- 
mas are available in the individual's self-concept to balance it or offset it? 
For example, in our work (Markus & Nurius, 1986; Cross & Markus, 1987) 
we find that most people have some version of the "fat, dumb, and ugly" 
self-schema that when activated can lead to a temporary depression in which 
one's self, one's future, and the world are all worthless and bleak. Yet most 
individuals also have a variety of other, often much more well-elaborated 
representations of the self, that will compete with, and eventually overpow- 
er, one's "self as worthless" schema. The same appears true in the area of 
eating disorders. A large proportion of college women report ideation that 
appears identical to that of anorexics and bulimics, yet only a relatively small 
proportion develop serious eating disorders. The key to the difference may 
rest with what other self-schemas the individual has also elaborated. Thus 
a desire to approach the state of perfect, elegant, essential thinness may be 
offset by a genuine love for food. Or it may be offset by the desire for per- 
fection in one's work or in one's relationships, concerns that may necessarily 
alter the single-minded pursuit of a given desired end-state. 
Negativity in the Self-System 
A focus on the structure of the overall self-concept and the interdepen- 
dencies and conffections among various representations of the self-system 
might also afford a better understanding of the role of negativity in the self- 
concept. Showers (1989b) finds, for example, that when negativity is com- 
partmentalized, individuals have higher self-evaluations than when the nega- 
tivity is distributed throughtout the self-concept. Increasingly, self-concept 
researchers are attending to the findings that all individuals seem to have 
some negative aspects of the self-concept. Wurf (1989) hypothesizes that nega- 
tive self-schemas may function to help individuals cope with the negativity 
in their lives, ensuring that negative experiences do not swamp the entire self- 
concept. She finds, in fact, that individuals who are extremely shy (and claim 
that it is important to their overall self-evaluation) handle negative feedback 
in this domain better than individuals who deemphasize or down-play the 
importance of their shyness. This raises the puzzling question of whether those 
who have elaborated negative self-schemas may actually feel better than those 
who have ignored certain negative aspects of the self. 
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Recently, many researchers are testing the potential positive effects of 
negative thoughts. Schwartz and Garamoni (1986) claim, in fact, that psy- 
chological adaptation depends on an alternation between both positive and 
negative states of mind. A complete segregation of the two, a focus just on 
the positive, may produce difficulty for the individual. Oyserman and Mar- 
kus (1989) find that a balance between negative self-conceptions and posi- 
tive self-conceptions in a given domain (e.g., expecting to finish school and 
fearing flunking out of school) is associated with positive outcomes like 
reduced levels of delinquency. And Cantor and colleagues (see Cantor & Kihl- 
strom, 1987) show that constructing negative scenarios may actually be high- 
ly motivating. 
Harter alerts clinicians to the finding that most individuals have quite 
fragmented, diverse selves and that this should not be considered pathologi- 
cal. Similarly, it now appears that negative self-representations are also com- 
monplace, perhaps even essential to healthy functioning, and their presence 
in the self-system should not be automatically interpreted as signaling trou- 
ble. The commonness of negative self-representations makes the need to fo- 
cus on the structure and the nature of the interdependencies of negative self- 
schemas among self-representations even more critical. Negative self- 
schemas are not all alike. What makes those associated with emotional dis- 
turbance different? 
Affect in the Self-System 
One major contribution of the cognitive approach is the understand- 
ing that emotional disturbances may be in part created and maintained by 
the particular hypotheses, theories, or conditional beliefs about the self that 
function to provide structure and meaning to one's experiences. In moving 
beyond this very significant insight, we still need to grapple with why social 
phobics, for example, have panic attacks in social situations, or why bulim- 
ics have such an all-consuming, unassailable fear of losing control and eat- 
ing too much. It may be that the self-schemas associated with pathological 
disorders have a unique set of emotional or motivational representations as- 
sociated with them. Representations of the self that derive from wishes or 
unfilled needs may have a very different form and function than representa- 
tions that derive from the more straightforward perception and organiza- 
tion of one's own behavior. Representations that are quite privately held and 
built largely from one's own inferences may be quite different than represen- 
tations that are shared by others and that incorporate their responses. Thus, 
a self-schema of being unloved that develops with the experience of a loss 
of parent may be quite different from the schema that develops with the 
knowledge and understanding that one is creative or talented in music. 
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Self-schemas that have their origins in early experience, experiences that 
are associated with the absence or presence of  anxiety in the parent and thus 
come to be categorized as the "good me" or the "bad me" (Sullivan, 1953) 
may well include a diversity of  bodily representations, some of  which may 
not be accessible to conscious awareness but which may be reinstated when 
the schema is activated. Schemas associated with emotional disorders may 
integrate all types of  self-representations- neural, motor, sensory. When such 
a schema is triggered by events in the environment, the individual may be 
caught in the grip of a powerful set of  reactions that are not easily offset 
or countered by conscious self-management techniques. The consequence of  
the activation of  such a schema will depend on whether it is figural and fo- 
cal against a ground of  weaker, less well-elaborated schemas, or whether it 
is relatively subordinate in one's organization of self-representations at a given 
time. 
That some schemas are so resistant to new information (the failure of  
the person with the eating disorder to believe that eating certain foods will 
not lead to uncontrollable, out-of-control eating) suggests that some self- 
schemas may have representations that are not easily verbalizable. These types 
of  concerns necessarily requires an explicit consideration of  the role of  af- 
fect (or more broadly, other than cognitive factors) in representations of  the 
self. One model, the one made explicit by Hurter, says that affect or emo- 
tion are a consequence of  the configuration of  self-representations that are 
currently actively in consciousness (see also Singer & Salovey, 1985). Another 
approach is to assume that one's experienced affect functions as a heuris- 
tic that determines whether various self-relevant events are assigned to a posi- 
tive or a negative class. Fast (1985) argues that affect plays a major  role in 
determining the connections among our experiences; it defines the similarity 
of  ours actions and thus provides the basis of  the organization of  the self- 
concept. Still others (Guntrip, 1971; Kemberg, 1977) suggest that each self- 
representation contains both an affective and a cognitive component.  
Furthermore, exploring the nature and functioning of  the affective or 
motivational aspects of  self-schemas may well require producing some threat, 
challenge, or uncertainty for the subject. As the work by Hammen and her 
colleagues have underscored, critical events and the mood they invoke in in- 
dividuals are often an important determinant of  self-schema content. The 
Hammen and Goodman-Brown study shows, for example, that the onset of 
depression is associated with particular stressors that are relevant to the sche- 
ma. Similarly, Linville (1987) finds that the complexity of  the self-structure 
only predicts well-being when the individual is in a stressful situation. Cur- 
rently, most experimental explorations of  the self-schemas are seldom affec- 
tively or motivationally engaging. If  stress is required to throw certain 
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self-representations and their functioning into high relief, then some impor- 
tant features of schema functioning may go uncharted if laboratory studies 
do not employ emotionally relevant stimuli. 
The Role  o f  the Other in the Self  
An issue that emerges in several of the papers in this volume is the crit- 
ical role of the other in producing and maintaining self-representation. In- 
creasingly, self-representations are being analyzed as the truly social entities 
they are theorized to be. While hypothesized to reside inside one's individu- 
al's head or heart, self-schemas are in large measure interpersonal achieve- 
ments. Others serve in a variety of roles, as co-producers of self-feeling and 
self-understanding, as monitors, as standard-bearers, or as partners in in- 
terior monologues. 
Harter systemically underscores the interpersonal nature of the self. She 
reports that older children become increasingly sensitive to the views of others 
and learn to use these views to verify and refine their own self-representations. 
As Harter's review indicates, young children do not engage in much explicit 
social comparison, yet is must still be the case that the self-systems of young 
children are heavily dependent on the responses of others. Studies by Stern 
(1985) and Trevarthen (1980) suggest that, in the early stages of develop- 
ment, others are less valuable for their views, images, or impressions of the 
self than they are for the affective quality and the contingency or close align- 
ment of their responses. 
Finely tuned, contingent responding from those in the individual's so- 
cial environment, particularly the early caretakers, may be a key to the de- 
velopment of viable self-schemas (e.g., Bowlby, 1969). And even though the 
development of all self-schemas is assumed to implicate others, it is quite 
likely that some self-schemas are tied more directly to the important people 
in one's life (and thus are more inherently interpersonal) than are other self- 
schemas. 
Difficulties with representing the self in connection to others may be 
particularly characteristic of those with emotional disorders. Several find- 
ings from the study by Hammen and Goodman-Brown are consistent with 
the notion. First, the association between depression or depression onset and 
the occurrence of negative life events that were schema-congruent held only 
for interpersonal schemas and not for achievement schemas. Further, in their 
study, a majority of the children who became depressed after schema- 
congruent negative events had mothers with unipolar or bipolar affective dis- 
orders. Mothers with affective disorders may be incapable of the sensitive 
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mothering that leads to signals essential for the development of an "I am 
loved" or and "I am worthy" self-schema. Studies of the content and struc- 
ture of the self-system like those proposed earlier could be used to assess 
such hypotheses. 
In another approach to the role of the other, rather than drawing out 
the interpersonal nature of the self-schema, Safran et aL explicitly discuss 
the notion of an "interpersonal schema." This label highlights the fact that 
representations of the self include the beliefs and expectations of others as 
well as assumptions about what is necessary to maintain this relatedness. 
Safran et aL also propose a number of intriguing methods for assessing such 
interpersonal schemas. Their paper emphasizes the need to explicitly impli- 
cate others in the development and maintenance of self-representations and 
identifies the relations between the self and others as an issue that will as- 
sume increasing importance in the study of representations of the self in emo- 
tional disorders. Many questions are raised. Do all schemas include 
representations of others? Are some schemas tied to representation of gener- 
alized others while others are tied to particular others? Are there individual 
differences (perhaps gender, ethnic, or cultural) in how schemas of the self 
incorporate others? 
Emerging Issues in Self-Representation 
This set of papers also reveals a number of tensions that may, and prob- 
ably should, become more apparent in future work. An important first ques- 
tion is whether studies of the self-schemas of those with emotional disorders 
tell us any more than that patients are indeed bothered by what they claim 
to be bothered by. As Bemis and Hollon ask, do we need the Stroop test 
to be sure that anorexic patients have problems with weight-related stimuli? 
Given the consensus that individuals, indeed even very young individuals, 
have structures of the self that actively create and organize their experiences, 
what more is to be gained by further studies primarily designed to show the 
pervasive influence of these schemas? 
As an answer to this question, some will claim that a great deal is still 
to be learned as we pinpoint the precise ways in which representations of 
the self govern our experiences. How early in the information-processing se- 
quences are self-representations invoked, for what types of stimuli, and in 
which types of situations are they most powerful? Answers to these types 
of questions are potentially very useful in devising therapy techniques and 
intervention strategies. 
Others will claim, however, that efforts would be better placed in ex- 
ploring the interpersonal events and situations that activate various schemas 
and in investigating how these schemas differ in content and functioning from 
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more viable self-schemas. Such efforts will involve focusing on individual 
maladaptive schemas, with all of their idiosyncratic content, and examining 
how these schemas are used to organize ongoing experience. Studying the 
generic body weight schema, the generic anxiety schema, or the generic self 
as worthless and unloved is useful only to a point. It is also necessary to 
see how these self-schemas are personalized and how they work within the 
total self-system. As Hope et al. point out, the use of standardized stimuli 
has obvious advantages, but such efforts may have to be coupled with an 
exploration of the personally relevant framings of particular domains if the 
role of self-representations in producing and maintaining emotional disord- 
er is to be understood. 
Another issue in need of further theoretical attention is the role of the 
self in the regulation of behavior. One view is that affect, motivation, the 
self-system, and behavior are separate, although interacting, systems. From 
this perspective, the basic psychological processes are distinct from the self- 
system. Self-representations influence these other systems but they are 
separate from them. 
Another view holds that the self-system is not just a system, rather it 
is the system-the central system that gives meaning to one's affective, motiva- 
tional, and even to one's cognitive processes. All affective reactions, all moti- 
vated actions implicate the self; the form they take and the work they do 
depend on the nature of the self. From such a perspective one might well 
question the value of trying to separate the effects of mood or affect on be- 
havior from the effects produced by the cognitive structures of the self. Self- 
representations carry their affect and their motivation with them, and thus 
motivation and affect are largely manifest in people's understandings of them- 
selves. And this may be particularly true for self-representations associated 
with affective disorders. It is the 'T'  who is sad, the 'T'  who is afraid of peo- 
ple, and the 'T'  who will be unable to stop eating. Without the 'T', needs, 
motives, feelings, and behaviors lose their meaning. Such a view leads to 
a questioning of how motivation and affect are represented in the self, and 
perhaps how they are differently represented by those with emotional dis- 
orders. 
In sum, these papers provide a number of significant empirical insights 
and theoretical suggestions. Moreover, they foreshadow a series of fu- 
ture challenges that will confront researchers committed to refining and ex- 
tending a cognitive perspective. 
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